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IN THE SUPRE!1E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

UTE CAL LAND DEVELOP!1ENT
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff, Respondent
and Cross-Appellant,

Case No. 16017

vs.
ROBERT R. SATHER and
BONNIE LEE SATHER,
Defendants, Appellants
and Cross-Respondents.

APPELLANTS' AND CROSS-RESPONDENTS' REPLY
BRIEF ON APPEAL

APPEAL FR0!1 JUDG!1ENT ON THE VERDICT OF
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
HONORABLE DAVID SAM, JUDGE

STATE!1ENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves the ownership of and the respective
interests of the parties in and to real property situate in
Uintah County, State of Utah.

Plaintiff claims damages from

defendants for taking possession of said property, and defendants
SATHER claim reimbursement from the plaintiff for money with
interest thereon advanced for plaintiff's benefit by defendants
SATHER in connection with said land.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury upon special interrogatories.

The jury found that plaintiff was the owner of the

real property and was entitled to possession thereof upon its
paying to the defendants SATHER the sum of $21,500.00.

The

jury further found that defendant ROBERT R. SATHER acted
"wilfully and maliciously" toward the plaintiff in taking
possession of said property, but awarded no damages to the
plaintiff as a consequence thereof.

The trial court, upon

motion of the defendants after the jury had been discharged,
declined to allow defendants interest on the money found by the
jury to be due from the plaintiff to the defendants, and the
trial court declined to grant the plaintiff's motion for a new
trial on the issue of damages.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek reversal of the jury finding that
defendant ROBERT R. SATHER was guilty of "wilful and malicious"
conduct toward the plaintiff; defendants seek a determination
that the plaintiff owes defendants the sum of $46,560.00 for
money advanced for plaintiff's benefit by the defendants; and
defendants seek a further determination that defendants are
entitled to interest on the sums owing from plaintiff to the
defendants.

Defendants,

on such issues.

in the alternative, seek a new trial

Defendants further seek affirmation of the

trial court's ruling denying the plaintiff's motion for a new
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trial on the issue of damages as raised by plaintiff's crossappeal in this matter.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants refer to and adopt the Statement of Facts
heretofore set forth in appellants' initial Brief on appeal.
ARGUHENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE REQUIRED A FINDING BY THE JURY THAT
DEFENDANTS SATHER WERE ENTITLED TO BE PAID THE Sill1 OF $46,560.00,
PLUS INTEREST, BY PLAINTIFF RATHER THAN ONLY THE SUH OF
$21,500.00.
Defendants reaffirm their position with respect to
the above point as set forth in appellants' original Brief,
Point II therein, and in addition thereto respectfully direct
the Court's attention to additional parts of the record which
are supplementary thereto, and which demonstrate that the
receipt of $25,000.00 by defendants SATHER from the proceeds
of the $50,000.00 loan from the bank to the plaintiff, was not
itself a loan from the plaintiff to the defendants SATHER.

As

testified by defendants SATHER, the $25,000.00 was received by
the defendants SATHER as a payment to them on a pre-existing
debt of Pete Buffo, president of plaintiff (TR-258), and Buffo
was given credit against his debt to defendants SATHER in such
amount (TR-258,269).
The defendants SATHER, as guarantors of plaintiff's
past due obligation to the bank, actually paid $46,560.00 of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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their own money to discharge plaintiff's debt to the bank, and
thus should be entitled to reimbursement from plaintiff in such
amount, plus interest, from the date of payment in March, 1974.
This is particularly so because of plaintiff's recognition of
the obligation as outlined in Pete Buffo's letter to defendant
SATHER dated September 25, 1974 (EX 71-D).
POINT II
DEFENDANTS SATHER HAVE NOT WAIVED THE RIGHT TO HAVE
THE COURT CONSIDER ADDING INTEREST.
Defendants SATHER concede that failure to object to
an insufficient or informal verdict before the jury is dismissed
constitutes a waiver of such deficiency.

(Langden vs. Inter-

national Transport Inc., 26 Utah 2d 452, 491 P. 2d 1211).
However, the jury verdict with respect to the award made in
favor of the defendants SATHER was not "insufficient" within
the meaning of that word as used in Rule 47(r), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
383 P.2d 934).

(See Jorgensen vs. Gonzales, 14 Utah 2d 330,
The jury was asked if the plaintiff was obligated

to pay any sum to the defendants SATHER, and if so, what amount.
The jury answered in the affirmative and indicated an amount of
$21,500.00.

(Special Interrogatories 14 and 15, R-601).

The

verdict as thus returned on this point was regular on its face
and was not any indication that defendants SATHER should be
deprived of interest on said amount.

The only figures before

the jury relative to such point showed that the defendants SATHER
paid the sum of $46,560.00 to the bank under their guarantee of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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plaintiff's loan (EX 49-P), and that defendants SATHER in order
to assist in raising the money, cashed in Savings Certificate
No. 19479 in the amount of $25,000.00 (TR-261), which certificate was purchased with money obtained by defendants SATHER from
the plaintiff from plaintiff's $50,000.00 bank loan.

The said

$25,000.00 sum was received by SATHER as payment on account
for money owed by Pete Buffo, president of plaintiff, to
defendants SATHER (TR-258).

This obligation to SATHER was

acknowledged by Pete Buffo in his letter to defendant SATHER
dated September 25, 1974.

(EX 71-D).

It thus appears rather

obvious that the jury in arriving at the amount of their award
to the defendants SATHER, deducted (mistakenly and erroneously
as pointed out in defendants SATHER'S argument in Point I above
and in the argument on Point II set forth in defendants' initial
Brief herein to which reference is hereby made), the said sum
of $25,000.00 from the amount defendants SATHER paid to the
bank to retire plaintiff's over-due note which had been guaranteed
by defendants SATHER.
Since interest could be awarded to the defendants on
such sum as a matter of law by the Court, there was no reason
or

obligation for defendants SATHER to pursue the matter

further with the jury.

(See Argument of Point III beginning

on page 18 of defendants' original appellants' Brief on file
in this matter).
The situation with respect to defendants SATHER'S
claim for interest is distinguishable from plaintiff's motion
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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for a new trial on the issue of damages.

The verdict returned

by the jury with respect to plaintiff's claim for damages was
at variance with their finding of fault on the part of defendants
SATHER, and thus plaintiff should be held to have waived any
right to a new trial on the issue of damages because of the
failure to have the matter clarified by the jury before the
jury was dismissed.

(See defendants' Argument of Point III

below to which reference is hereby made).
POINT III
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL ON THE ISSUE
OF DAMAGES AS CLAIMED IN PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-APPEAL.
The jury found that plaintiff had not been damaged
by any actions of the defendants.

To Special Interrogatory

No. 4 which reads as follows:
"After subtracting any monies due Mr. Sather from
Ute Cal Land Development Corporation, what money
damages, if any, did Ute Cal Land Development
Corporation sustain as a direct result of the
delivery of the warranty deed to Mr. Sather",
the jury answered, "None",

(R-599).

The foregoing responses were made by the jury even
though they found that the agreement between defendants SATHER
and the plaintiff (EX 3-P), which permitted defendants SATHER
to claim the deed to the property in question in the event
defendants SATHER should pay off plaintiff's $50,000.00 loan
to the bank, had been cancelled (Special Interrogatories l and
2, R-598), and even though the jury also found that the
defendants SATHER had acted wilfully and maliciously toward
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the plaintiff in obtaining the said deed from the bank (EX 32-P;
Special Interrogatory No. 10, R-600).
In answer to Special Interrogatory No. 11 which reads
as follows:
"If your answer to No. 10 is yes, what amount of
punitive damages do you assess to the defendant
only?"
the jury answered, "None" (R-600).
The plaintiff, at the time the verdict was returned
and before the jury was dismissed, did not ask the Court to
have the jury consider the damage issue further, although there
was ample opportunity to do so and although there was considerable discussion of the matter between Court and counsel (TR 323326).

The plaintiff has thus waived any right to have the

issue of damages considered on appeal.
If, as the jury found,

the defendants SATHER had no

right to gain possession of the deed from the bank and to take
possession of the property in question as they did, then the
plaintiff should have been entitled to some compensation, even
though nominal.

The verdict was thus insufficient on its face

as to that point and the plaintiff should have requested the
Court to direct the jury to consider the matter further (Rule
47(r) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure).
Plaintiff would have the Court adopt a determination
that the verdict was regular on its face in this respect, but
only lacking in amount.
as used in Rule 47(r).

Such is not the meaning of "insufficient"
For the purposes of that rule, the word
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"insufficient" means inadequate or lacking in some purpose or
use.

(Jorgensen vs. Gonzales, supra).

The Jorgensen case was

cited with approval by this Court in Langton vs. International
Transport Inc., supra, and wherein the following language was
quoted,

to-wit:
"The general and well established rule is that
so long as the jury is functioning as such in
the course of the trial and until it is discharged, it is subject to directions and instructions from the court to the end that the issues
be fully tried, deliberated upon and a correct
verdict rendered.
And where it is apparent
that there is some patent error in connection
with the verdict, the court may, of course, call
the matter to their attention and direct them
to deliberate."
The plaintiff in the Langton case (supra) was in the

same position as the plaintiff in this case, having failed to
request the Court to re-submit the matter to the jury on the
issue of damages, and wherein this Court approved the following
language:
"He are satisfied that when the plaintiff, after
acquainting himself with the verdict, made no
objections to its receipt and no motion that the
cause be re-committed to the jury, he waived the
objection now under analysis.
Having waived them,
they were unavailable as the basis for a motion
for a new trial.
The motion should, therefore,
have been denied".
As further stated in Langton vs. International
Transport Inc., supra:
"There is a basic distinction between an insufficient or informal verdict and a verdict regular
on its face, which mvards inadequate damages,
appearing to have been given under the influence
of passion or prejudice.
In the latter case, a
new trial must be granted to correct the error.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In the former case, counsel has an opportunity to
assert an objection, and the court, under Rule 47(r)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, may return the Jury
for further del~beration and with further instructions to correct the irregularity.
If counsel does
not avail himself of this opportunity, his objection
to the irregularity of the verdict is waived".
In the case of Cohn vs. J. C. Penney Company, 537 P.2d
306, the jury found for the plaintiff on the issue of liability
but failed to award any general damages.

This Court held in

that case that:
"In the instant matter there was not merely an
inadequate award of general damages, there was no
award at all.
The verdict was deficient in form,
and counsel had an opportunity to have the jury
sent back for further deliberations.
This he did
not do, perhaps fearing that the jury might either
award some nominal amount or even change the
verdict and award nothing to the plaintiff.
It
would be a smart trial tactic if he could have
had a new trial on damages only before a jury
which would not be acquainted with the weakness
of plaintiff's cause of action".
The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for a new
trial on the issue of damages (R 670-671), and such a determination is within the discretion of the trial court (58 Am. Jur.
2d 209).

The determination of the trial court on that matter

should not be reversed where there is not an abuse of that
discretion.
this case.

No abuse of discretion on that point is evident in
(Uptown Appliance and Radio Company vs. Flint, 122

Utah 298, 249 P.2d 826).
CONCLUSION
Defendants SATHER refer to their initial appellants'
Brief herein and adopt the Conclusions therein stated.

It is
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further respectfully submitted that plaintiff has waived any
right to a new trial on the issue of damages by reason of the
failure to raise that matter before the jury was dismissed.
In any event, should a new trial be ordered in this matter,
such new trial should be on all issues.

Respectfully submitted,

CERTIFICATE OF

~~ILING

Two copies of the foregoing were mailed, postage
prepaid, to Deland & McRae, attorneys for plaintiff, respondent
and cross-app~ll~nt, 317 West 1st South Street, Vernal, Utah
84078, this~~ day of May, 1979.
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